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A Right of Confrontation for
Competition Hearings Before the
European Commission
Procedural fairness lies at the bedrock of justice.1
Among all procedural rights in the American judicial system,
the right of a criminal defendant to confront and cross-examine
government witnesses is one of the most vital.2 Crossexamination allows criminal defendants to test the perception
and memory of witnesses, while giving a neutral fact-finder a
first-hand view of the witnesses’ consistency, credibility, and
biases.3 As Wigmore noted, it is “the greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth.”4
On September 12, 2009, Christine Varney, the United
States Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, called on
“competition agencies, international organizations, and the
antitrust community to discuss procedural fairness more
broadly, focusing on the opportunity to refine procedures that
parties can understand and rely on as a means of removing
unnecessary uncertainty from enforcement efforts.”5 Nowhere
is procedural fairness more important in competition law than
in cartel enforcement, an area of the law dealing with
agreements among competitors to restrain trade through
actions such as “price-fixing, market allocation, and bidrigging,”6 where fines and prison sentences can have
catastrophic consequences for defendants.7
1

See David E. Shipley, Due Process Rights before EU Agencies: The Rights of
Defense, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 50-51 (2008); Christine A. Varney, Ass’t Attorney
Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Procedural Fairness, Address Before the
13th Annual Competition Conference of the International Bar Association 1 (Sept. 12,
2009) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/249974.pdf).
2
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
3
See Fred O. Smith, Crawford’s Aftershock: Aligning the Regulation of
Nontestimonial Hearsay with the History and Purposes of the Confrontation Clause, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1518 (2008).
4
3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (2d ed. 1923).
5
See Varney, supra note 1, at 4.
6
See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
FIGHTING HARD CORE CARTELS: HARM, EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AND LENIENCY

1489

1490

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4

This note focuses on the adequacy of procedural
safeguards in cartel enforcement proceedings in the European
Union (“EU”). Specifically, it will investigate the European
Commission’s8 (“EC” or “Commission”) use of “paperless”
applications9 for leniency from fines and oral statements
gathered during cartel investigations absent a right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses. Because co-conspirators are
rewarded with leniency based upon either the sufficiency or
“added value” of the information they offer to the Commission,10
they have an incentive to paint this evidence in a light least
favorable to their fellow cartel members and most favorable to
themselves.11 Without a mechanism for targeted corporations to
directly ascertain the truth of those allegations,12 the use of oral
statements as evidence in EC cartel enforcement proceedings
raises a number of the classic evils against which the rights of
confrontation and cross-examination are designed to protect.13
Recently, commentators have argued that because oral
statements in the EC are unsworn, declarants are not subject
to compulsory process, and the prosecuted parties are not
afforded an opportunity to confront and cross-examine
declarants, the use of these statements as evidence violates the
rights that targets of EC cartel enforcement proceedings should
enjoy.14 However, the solutions that these critics have offered go
too far—requiring a wholesale reform of EC competition
PROGRAMS 11 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/44/1841891.pdf
[hereinafter O.E.C.D., FIGHTING HARD CORE CARTELS]; Jason D. Medinger, Comment,
Antitrust Leniency Programs: A Call for Increased Harmonization as Proliferating
Programs Undermine Deterrence, 52 EMORY L.J. 1439, 1439 (2003).
7
Imran Aslam and Michael Ramsden, EC Dawn Raids: A Human Rights
Violation?, 5 COMPETITION L. REV. 61, 62 (2008); Ian S. Forrester, Due Process in EC
Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution with Flawed Procedures, 34 EUR. L.
REV. 817, 825-29 (2009); Donald Slater, Sébastien Thomas & Denis Waelbroeck,
Competition Law Proceedings Before the European Commission and the Right to a Fair
Trial: No Need for Reform?, 3-4, 10-11 (The Global Competition Law Centre Working
Papers Series, Working Paper 04/08), available at http://www.coleurope.eu/content/
gclc/documents/GCLC%20WP%2004-08.pdf.
8
The European Commission is the administrative body of the European
Union charged with enforcing its competition laws. Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, art. 105, Sept. 5. 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115/47).
9
Robert Grasso, Note, The E.U. Leniency Program and U.S. Civil Discovery
Rules: A Fraternal Fight?, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 565, 577, 582 (2008); Julian M. Joshua,
Oral Statements in EC Competition Proceedings: A Due Process Short-Cut?,
COMPETITION L. INSIGHT, Dec. 7, 2004, at 1 (2004).
10
See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
11
Forrester, supra note 7, at 833.
12
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
13
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
14
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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procedure. This note proposes a more conservative solution
grounded in the right of confrontation jurisprudence of the
United States.
Part I of this note will provide a brief historical
overview of the global development of competition law, cartel
enforcement, and leniency programs, and will present the
United States’ approach as a model. Part II will outline the
relevant competition laws of the EU, as well as the standards
of procedural fairness that currently undergird those laws.
Part III will argue that the current procedural safeguards have
not kept pace with the EC’s substantive and procedural trends
toward a criminal and adversarial system. Lastly, Part IV will
survey competing proposals for procedural reforms in the EC
and will offer a counterproposal. Specifically, this note will
argue that the correct solution to the inadequacy of the current
EC competition hearing procedures is to amend the regulations
governing cartel enforcement to allow for a right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses modeled on the American
approach, as outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Crawford v. Washington.15
I.

BACKGROUND AND THE AMERICAN MODEL

In order to understand the current European cartel
enforcement regime, it is first important to understand the
goals and development of competition laws. In general,
competition laws are designed to promote competition in
market economies for the benefit of consumers,16 a goal
achieved through two basic means: (1) laws prohibiting
excessive market power, and (2) laws designed to deter and
prosecute unfair competition among competitors.17 The first
category includes the regulation of mergers and acquisitions, as
well as anti-monopoly laws, while the second category, which is
the subject of this note, concerns the preservation of
competition and market fairness.18 Additionally, a full
understanding of modern European cartel enforcement
requires a familiarity with the cartel enforcement regime of the
15

541 U.S. 36, 60-65, 68 (2004).
See Eleanor M. Fox, Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual
Network, 43 INT’L LAW. 151, 152 (2009) [hereinafter Fox, Linked-In].
17
Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down,
and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000) [hereinafter Fox, Antitrust and
Regulatory Federalism].
18
Id.
16

1492

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4

United States, which remains a dominant influence in the
shaping of EC competition policies and procedures.19
A.

Background

In response to the proliferation of industrial
combinations, known as “trusts,” the United States enacted the
Sherman Act of 1890, which was designed to (1) “prevent[] the
high prices associated with monopoly or cartel activity” and to
(2) protect[] the right of every person to practice a trade of
choice.”20 For the next fifty years, aggressive competition
enforcement was largely limited to the United States.21
However, the second half of the twentieth century saw a
significant increase in competition laws globally.22 Today,
competition laws are enforced in over 100 jurisdictions,23
including multiple cross-border competition “networks.”24 One
area of competition law, cartel enforcement, is executed
through a number of investigative and deterrent mechanisms
designed to ferret out cartel activity, which is notoriously
secretive.25 And while global competition authorities differ in
their approaches to cartel enforcement, one mechanism has
proved especially effective at cartel detection and enforcement:
the “leniency program.”26
Under a leniency program, a competition authority
encourages cartel members to self-report anticompetitive
19

See Wouter P.J. Wils, Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the
Answer?, 28 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 117, 136-37 (2005); A. Paul Victor, et
al., International Cartels Roundtable, 2003 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. INT’L ANTITRUST
LAW & POL. 93, 100 [hereinafter International Cartels Roundtable].
20
Lawrence A. Sullivan & Warren S. Grimes, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 6 (2000).
21
Fox, Linked-In, supra note 16, at 152.
22
See id.
23
Id. at 154.
24
Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, supra note 17, at 1782.
25
See Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit
the Crime 9, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/articles/240611.pdf (last
visited June 26, 2010) (“[C]artel activity is almost invariably covert, and participants
often engage in affirmative acts of concealments.”).
26
O.E.C.D., FIGHTING HARD CORE CARTELS supra note 6, at 7. (“Leniency
programs uncover conspiracies that would otherwise go undetected and also make the
ensuing investigations more efficient and effective. Experience shows that these
programs work.”); Julian M. Joshua, That Uncertain Feeling: The Commission’s 2002
Leniency Notice, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF
PROHIBITION OF CARTELS 512 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Anatnasiu eds.,
2006) (“[N]o self-respecting antitrust agency with any aspiration to effective
enforcement is without a leniency policy.”).
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conduct in return for a conditional promise either to refrain
from bringing criminal charges or to reduce potential fines.27
Leniency programs destabilize cartels by creating a “prisoner’s
dilemma,” fostering distrust among co-conspirators and
providing an incentive for each member to turn in its fellow
cartel participants to competition authorities.28 The leniency
program has been described by American officials as
“[u]nquestionably . . . the greatest investigative tool ever
designed to fight cartels.”29 The first cartel leniency program
was developed in 1978 in the United States.30 Today, nearly
fifty countries have enacted leniency programs.31 These
programs have been highly successful, resulting in
extraordinary fines and significant prison sentences.32
B.

The American Model

The United States takes an aggressive approach to
criminal cartel enforcement. The Assistant Attorney General
for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has
stated that cartel conduct is “unambiguously harmful.”33 The
United States Supreme Court has described cartels as “the
supreme evil of antitrust.”34 Government officials have justified
criminal prosecution of cartel offenses on a number of grounds,
including the secretive nature of cartels,35 the existence of
27

See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel
Stability, 31 J. CORP. L. 453, 454, 473-77 (2006).
28
See Roger W. Fones, Rony P. Gerrits & Nicole D. Devero, Antitrust
Leniency Programs and their Impact on the Aviation Industry, AIR & SPACE L., at 1, 19
(2008) (internal quotations omitted); Leslie, supra note 27 at 455.
29
Scott D. Hammond, Dir. Of Crim. Enforcement, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program, Presented Before the ICN
Workshop on Leniency Programs 2 (November 22-23, 2004) (transcript available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/206611.pdf) [hereinafter Hammond, Cornerstones of
an Effective Leniency Program].
30
J. Anthony Chavez, More Aggressive Action to Curb International Cartels,
1739 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE: CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 807, 818 (2009); Hammond, Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program,
supra note 29, at 3 & n.1.
31
See Chavez, supra note 30, at 853.
32
See, e.g., id. at 847-48.
33
Christine A. Varney, Ass’t Att. General, Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Striving for the Optimal Balance in Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks Prepared
for The Council on Foreign Relations 14 (Oct. 8, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/250814.pdf).
34
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408 (2004).
35
International Cartels Roundtable, supra note 19, at 96. James Griffin, who
was then the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
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criminal intent when participating in a cartel, and the
inherently anticompetitive conduct of cartels.36 The American
impulse to view cartel conduct as criminal has “been part of the
American antitrust system from the beginning,”37 and it is an
impulse that is reflected in its laws, severe penalties, and
aggressive enforcement techniques.38 However, the United
States also maintains a robust set of procedural protections,
which guard against prosecutorial abuse and ensure respect for
the fundamental rights of defendants at trial.39
1. The Antitrust Laws
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal.”40 Despite the breadth of Section 1 prohibitions, U.S.
criminal cartel enforcement primarily focuses on price-fixing,41
bid-rigging,42 and market allocation43 between competitors—
known as the “hard-core” antitrust offenses.44 The penalties for
Department of Justice, noted that international cartels, “like all other cartels, are
secret in nature. Often victims don’t even know they are being victimized, and
increasingly cartel members are taking actions to ensure that they do not leave
significant evidence around. . . .” Id.
36
See Werden, supra note 25, at 5.
37
Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish
Cartels and Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 694 (2001).
38
See Wils, supra note 19, at 122-24.
39
Id.
40
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
41
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET
ALLOCATION SCHEMES: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT TO LOOK FOR 2 (2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/211578.pdf (“Price fixing is an agreement
among competitors to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at which their goods or
services are sold. It is not necessary that the competitors agree to charge exactly the
same price, or that every competitor in a given industry join the conspiracy.”)
[hereinafter PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET ALLOCATION SCHEMES].
42
See id. (“Bid rigging is the way that conspiring competetors [sic] effectively
raise prices where purchasers — often federal, state, or local governments — acquire
goods or services by soliciting competing bids.”).
43
See id. at 3 (“Market division or allocation schemes are agreements in
which competitors divide markets among themselves. In such schemes, competing
firms allocate specific customers or types of customers, products, or territories among
themselves.”).
44
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION
HANDBOOK 3 (2d ed. 2006); Baker, supra note 37, at 694-95 (“Over time . . . the DOJ,
and more importantly the courts, gradually developed distinguishing lines between the
kinds of anticompetitive conduct that should be punished criminally and the remaining
conduct, which would only be subject to civil injunctions by the government and private
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criminal antitrust violations in the United States are
potentially severe. Under the Antitrust Criminal Penalty
Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 (“ACPERA”), guilty
corporations face fines as high as $100 million, while
individuals may face up to $1 million in fines and ten years in
jail.45 These aggressive and ever-increasing penalties have led
to the collection of over $5.3 billion in fines over the last fifteen
years.46
2. Powers of Investigation and the Division’s Leniency
Program
The United States Department of Justice’s Antitrust
Division (the “Division”) enforces the Sherman Act by
conducting
investigations
and
prosecuting
offending
corporations and individuals in federal court.47 Division
investigations employ a wide array of aggressive techniques,
including wiretaps, informants, and search warrants, to
discover cartels and to build cases.48 However, above all other
techniques, the Corporate and Individual Leniency Programs
have been the “most effective generator of international cartel
cases” for the Division.49
The Division first adopted its Corporate Leniency
Program in 1978, and subsequently revised it in 1993.50 The
damage cases by injured victims. Thus, price-fixing, bid-rigging, and customer and
market allocations came to be regarded as criminal, while most other conduct (for
example, joint venture rules, standard setting practices, and vertical restraints) came
to be regarded as only suitable for civil prosecution.”) (citations omitted); Michael
Lazerwitz & Adam Miller, USA, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO
CARTELS & LENIENCY 2009 261, available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/
Publications/pdf/2577.pdf (internal quotations omitted).
45
See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-237, §215, 118 Stat. 661, 668 (2004); Chavez, supra note 30, at 855-61;
Michael D. Hausfeld, Michael P. Lehmann & Megan E. Jones, Observations from the
Field: ACPERA’s First Five Years, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 95, 96-97 (2009).
46
See Chavez, supra note 30, at 836.
47
PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET ALLOCATION SCHEMES, supra
note 41, at 1.
48
Chavez, supra note 30, at 824-26.
49
Scott D. Hammond, Dir. Of Crim. Enforcement, Antirust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, A Summary Overview of the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement
Program, Presented Before the New York State Bar Association Annual Meeting 5
(Jan. 23, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/
200686.pdf) [hereinafter Hammond, Summary Overview].
50
Hammond, Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program, supra note 29,
at 3 n.1. Describing the changes from 1978 to 1993, Hammond noted that “[t]he
Amnesty Program was revised in three major respects. First, the policy was changed to
ensure that amnesty is automatic if there is no pre-existing investigation. . . . Second,
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revised program sets forth two means of achieving leniency,
“Part A Leniency”51 and “Part B Leniency,”52 which are
differentiated based on whether the Division is aware of the
illegal activity being reported at the time when the corporation

the Division created an alternative amnesty, whereby amnesty is available even if
cooperation begins after an investigation is underway. Third, if a corporation qualifies
for automatic amnesty, then all directors, officers, and employees who come forward
with the corporation and agree to cooperate also receive automatic amnesty.” Id.
51
Under Part A Leniency, the Division will grant a corporation leniency if,
before an investigation has begun, it meets six criteria:
1. At the time the corporation comes forward to report the illegal activity, the
Division has not received information about the illegal activity being reported
from any other source;
2. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported,
took prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity;
3. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and
provides full, continuing and complete cooperation to the Division throughout
the investigation;
4. The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to
isolated confessions of individual executives or officials;
5. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties; and
6. The corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal
activity and clearly was not the leader in, or originator of, the activity.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY 1-2 (1993),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf [hereinafter CORPORATE
LENIENCY POLICY].
52
Under Part B Leniency, if a corporation does not meet the requirements for
Part A Leniency, it may qualify for leniency if—before or after an investigation has
begun—it meets the following seven criteria:
1. The corporation is the first one to come forward and qualify for leniency
with respect to the illegal activity being reported;
2. The Division, at the time the corporation comes in, does not yet have
evidence against the company that is likely to result in a sustainable
conviction;
3. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported,
took prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity;
4. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and
provides full, continuing and complete cooperation that advances the Division
in its investigation;
5. The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to
isolated confessions of individual executives or officials;
6. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties; and
7. The Division determines that granting leniency would not be unfair to
others, considering the nature of the illegal activity, the confessing
corporation’s role in it, and when the corporation comes forward.
Id. at 2-3.
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first applies for leniency. In 1994, the Division also released an
Individual Leniency Policy, which encourages “individuals who
approach the Division on their own behalf, not as part of a
corporate proffer or confession, to seek leniency for reporting
illegal antitrust activity of which the Division has not
previously been made aware.”53 Additionally, only the first
corporation or individual to approach the Division is granted
leniency, creating a race between conspirators.54
Leniency applications to the Division may be made in
writing or orally,55 although full cooperation inevitably requires
witness statements and the production of relevant documents.56
The availability of oral—or “paperless”—leniency is vital to the
success of the program, because “amnesty does not protect
recipients from liability in private damage actions, [such that]
companies would be loathe to participate or cooperate if there
were a substantial risk that the evidence they provide the
Justice Department could be used against them in the civil
suits that inevitably follow.”57
In the event that a corporation or individual is granted
leniency, the Department of Justice issues a Conditional
Leniency Letter, which contains the conditions of leniency and
the cooperation required of that corporation or individual.58
53

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., LENIENCY POLICY FOR
INDIVIDUALS 1 (1994), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
0092.pdf. In order to qualify for individual leniency, the applicant in question (1) must
approach the Division before it has received any information about the anticompetitive
conduct and prior to the initiation of any investigation or corporate application for
leniency; (2) must report the illegal activity “with candor and completeness” and
“provide[] full, continuing and complete cooperation to the Division throughout the
investigation;” and (3) the individual must not have “coerce[d] another party to
participate in the illegal activity” and must not have been the “leader in, or originator
of, the activity.” Id. at 1-2.
54
See CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 51.
55
William Kolasky, Criminalising Cartel Activity: Lessons from the U.S.
Experience, 12 COMPETITION & CONSUMER L. REV. 207, 213 (2004).
56
See Lazerwitz & Miller, supra note 44, at 264.
57
Kolasky, supra note 55, at 213.
58
This cooperation includes seven elements, requiring the corporation to: (a)
provide “a full exposition” of all the facts relevant to its anticompetitive conduct; (b)
produce the remaining, non-privileged, relevant documents related to that conduct; (c)
to secure and encourage current and former “directors, officers, and employees” to
provide all relevant information related to the conduct; (d) to facilitate the appearance
of such employees for interviews and testimony related to the reported anticompetitive
activity; (e) to use its “best efforts” to ensure “complete[], candid[], and truthful[]”
responses to all interviews, grand jury appearances, and trials; (f) to use its “best
efforts” to ensure that such individuals “make no attempt either falsely to protect or
falsely to implicate any person or entity;” and (g) to make all reasonable efforts to pay
restitution to those injured by any anticompetitive conduct reported that effects the
United States. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division, Model Corporate Conditional
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Furthermore, the Corporate Conditional Leniency Letter
extends leniency to those directors, officers, and employees who
provide relevant information and admit to anticompetitive
activity, subject to further conditions.59 If the applying
corporation or individual meets the conditions for leniency and
the Division receives the benefit of the information that the
leniency applicant provides, the Division will grant Final
Leniency.60
Where the Division determines that there is sufficient
evidence to proceed with a prosecution—generally where there
is direct evidence of collusion—it may convene a grand jury61 to
determine whether there is enough evidence to bring formal
charges against the alleged conspirators.62 Once formal charges
are brought, federal cartel cases are tried in open court before a
judge and jury, with attendant procedural rights for defendants
and a requirement that the alleged conduct be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.63
3. Procedural Fairness in the United States
While the United States has historically approached
cartel enforcement with vigor—whether through persistent
investigation, innovative programs, or devastating penalties—
its zealousness has been tempered by a robust set of procedural
safeguards, including (1) constitutional safeguards, (2)
statutory safeguards, and (3) policy safeguards.64 One vital
constitutional provision is the criminal defendant’s right to
Leniency Letter 2-3 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/
239524.pdf [hereinafter Model Corporate Conditional Leniency Letter]; see also U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division, Model Individual Conditional Leniency Letter
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/239526.pdf.
59
See CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 51, at 4 (“If a corporation
qualifies for leniency under Part A, above, all directors, officers, and employees of the
corporation who admit their involvement in the illegal antitrust activity as part of the
corporate confession will receive leniency, in the form of not being charged criminally
for the illegal activity, if they admit their wrongdoing with candor and completeness
and continue to assist the Division throughout the investigation.”).
60
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S LENIENCY PROGRAM AND MODEL
LENIENCY LETTERS 24-27 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
criminal/239583.pdf; Model Corporate Conditional Leniency Letter, supra note 58, at 1.
61
DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV. GRAND JURY MANUAL, I-2-I-7 (1991),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/206542.pdf.
62
Id.
63
These procedures are required under the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Wils, supra note 19, at 124.
64
Wils, supra note 19, at 124.
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confront and cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses at
trial.65 This right is buttressed by criminal and procedural
sanctions for untruthful witness practices.66 One recent and
notable case, United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., demonstrates
the necessity of these procedural safeguards.67
a. Constitutional Safeguards—The Right of
Confrontation
The Constitution of the United States enshrines a
panoply of rights for criminal defendants at trial.68 These rights
form the procedural backbone of the adversarial system, one
which presumes the innocence of defendants and includes both
a jury and “a judge who does not . . . conduct the factual and
legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of
facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.”69 One
of the key facets of the adversarial system in the United States
is the right of a defendant to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him or her. The Supreme Court has held this
right to exist in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution.70
First, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him . . . .”71 Centuries of Supreme Court case law have
interpreted this clause as requiring “an opportunity for crossexamination by defense counsel in front of the jury, ordinarily
with the defendant and the witness both in the courtroom.”72
The Confrontation Clause serves a number of purposes,
reflecting a cold view of the inquisitorial practices of

65

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
These protections are both statutory and contractual. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 401-02, 1503, 1621, 1623 (2006); see also Model Corporate Conditional Leniency
Letter (2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/239524.pdf.
67
United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D. Pa. 2007);
see discussion infra Part I.B.3.c.
68
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI. These rights include the right against selfincrimination, the right to a speedy and public trial, the right to an impartial jury, and
the right of the accused to confront adverse witnesses. Id.
69
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991).
70
U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI, XIV; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
71
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
72
David A. Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1635, 1645
(2009).
66
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Continental Europe (and their brief use in England), and
effectuating important practical objectives.73 First, the
Confrontation Clause, together with its attendant right to
cross-examination, serves as a shield against inquisitorial
practices that were commonplace in medieval and renaissance
England.74 These practices were first introduced through the
English Marian bail and committal statutes, under which
justices of the peace, acting both as investigators and
prosecutors, were required to interrogate suspects and
witnesses ex parte in order to determine whether to discharge
or commit the suspects until trial.75 The results of these
examinations were certified in court, and while they were not
originally intended to serve as evidence against the defendant
at trial, over time that practice began to invade the adversarial
system.76
The danger of these practices came into clear view
during the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603.77 There, the
defendant Raleigh was tried for treason based on the ex parte,
signed confession of his alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, who
had been imprisoned.78 Because Cobham later retracted his
73

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
Id. at 44-45; Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the
Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV.
557, 569-70 (1992) (“With the ascent of the Tudors, the English crown began to exercise
more control over its enemies by importing techniques from the civil law in to the
indigenous, essentially accusatorial, system of criminal procedure. Criminal
proceedings took on a more inquisitorial slant with the use of preliminary
examinations and increased reliance on prerogative courts . . . During the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, justices of the peace conducted preliminary examinations in
ordinary criminal proceedings at common law. The justices—government officials who
exercised police, administrative and judicial functions—privately interrogated the
suspect, his accusers, and the witnesses against him. These examinations were then
introduced into evidence to the detriment of the defendant who had neither the
assistance of counsel nor the ability to call witnesses on his behalf . . . . In cases of
great political importance, however, the Privy Council, or the judicial members of the
Council, examined the suspect and the other witnesses. At trial, proof usually consisted
of reading statements that had been made out of court, such as depositions, confessions
of accomplices, and letters. In his history of the common law, Stephen concluded that
this prosecution on the basis of written statements ‘occasioned frequent demands by
the prisoner to have his “accusers,” i.e. the witnesses against him, brought before him
face to face.’”) (internal citations omitted).
75
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45.
76
Id. However, some commentators have challenged the Court’s historical
accuracy on this point. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and
When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK.
L. REV. 105, 107-08 (2005); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical
Assumptions of Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 224 (2005).
77
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
78
See generally 1 CRIMINAL TRIALS 389-520 (David Jardine ed., 1850).
74
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confession, Raleigh argued that the confession should not be
used against him, and demanded to have Cobham brought
before the court, believing that Cobham would not corroborate
his previous confession in open court with Raleigh present.79
The Court refused this request and sentenced Raleigh to
death.80 The public viewed this refusal as an egregious
perversion of common law procedure, and it ultimately spurred
the institution of the protective procedural rights of
confrontation and cross-examination both in England and the
early United States.81
However, while some commentators have asserted that
the purpose of the Confrontation Clause in American
jurisprudence ends with “anti-inquisitorialism,”82 in fact, the
clause finds solid grounding in practical objectives well-served
by the rights.83 These purposes include the ability to test the
perception and memory of a witness; the ability of the trier of
fact to view a witness’ “demeanor and language” when
subjected to questioning; the ability to focus a witness’
testimony on key issues or discrepancies; the ability to
immediately challenge a witness’ story; and the ability to
reveal potential biases in a witness’ account.84 At its core, the
Confrontation Clause is “designed to promote the truth.”85

79

At the trial, Raleigh stated, “It is now clear that he hath since retracted;
therefore since his accusation is recalled by himself, let him now by word of mouth
convict or condemn me.” Id. at 434.
80
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
81
Id. at 44, 47-48; see also Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination: Seemingly
Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent, and “At Risk”, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 427, 429-30
(2009) (“Langbein found cross-examination to be a necessary . . . response to three
occurrences in the English trial system: the growing use of lawyers to present
prosecutions in both the investigative and trial stages; the reward system that offered
bounties to those who provided testimony establishing that a crime reached the
severity (or degree of financial loss) to qualify as a felony and thus invited fraudulent
testimony, the corrupt motive of which required cross-examination as an antidote; and
‘the crown witness system for obtaining accomplice evidence in gang crimes, a
prosecutorial technique that created further risks of perjured testimony.’”) (citing JOHN
H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 246 (2003)).
82
Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 694
(1996) (describing the history behind the Confrontation Clause as one “born of
revulsion against trial by affidavit.”); see also Sklansky, supra note 72, at 1688-94.
83
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 n.4 (1974); Amar, supra note 82, at
688; Berger, supra note 74, at 560-61; Fred O. Smith, Crawford’s Aftershock: Aligning
the Regulation of Nontestimonial Hearsay with the History and Purposes of the
Confrontation Clause, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1518 (2008).
84
Davis, 415 U.S. at 316; Smith, supra note 83, at 1518.
85
Amar, supra note 82, at 649, 688.
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Recently, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of
the Confrontation Clause in a series of groundbreaking cases,86
beginning with Crawford v. Washington.87 In Crawford, the
Court relied on American and English common law to reach an
understanding of the Confrontation Clause intended to reflect
its original meaning.88 Specifically, the Court held that
“testimonial” hearsay statements,89 when made by a witness
who is not present at trial, are inadmissible as evidence unless
(1) the witness is unavailable and (2) the defendant previously
had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.90 The Court
broadly defined a “witness” as any person who “bears
testimony,” and further defined testimony as “typically ‘[a]
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact.’”91 As a result, the Crawford
standard rejected the test set forth in an earlier case, Ohio v.
Roberts, which admitted hearsay statements of witnesses not
available for cross-examination so long as those statements
bore sufficient “indicia of reliability.”92 In overruling Roberts,
86

Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 129 S. Ct. 2927 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45.
87
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45.
88
Id. at 43-50. Although some critics have called into question the accuracy
and rigor of the majority’s historical analysis, see, e.g., Davies, supra note 76, at 114-20,
the purpose of recounting the history and holding of Crawford here is solely to
highlight the dangers of inquisitorialism that the opinion addresses, and the ways in
which it attempts to formulate a confrontation framework that protects against those
dangers.
89
“Hearsay” is defined in U.S. federal law as “a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.” FED R. EVID. 801(c).
90
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
91
Id.; see also Sklansky, supra note 72, at 1646 (“Introducing evidence of an
out-of-court accusation from someone who never testifies raises some of the same
concerns as examining a witness outside the defendant’s presence: in either case the
defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the accuser in front of the jury.”).
92
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (“[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not
present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a
showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence
must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.”). Notably, and most egregiously, in the years leading up to the
Roberts decision, a number of appellate circuits extended the so-called “residual”
hearsay exception, FED. R. EVID. 807, to admit grand jury testimony of witnesses who
did not testify at trial. Berger, supra note 74, at 610 (in describing the dangers of this
practice in the context of prosecutorial overreach, Professor Berger stated the
following: “[A]dmitting grand jury testimony by a now-unavailable declarant pursuant
to the residual hearsay exception . . . is clearly incompatible with a prosecutorial
restraint interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. These statements are elicited, and
often prepared, by the prosecutor. It is difficult to imagine why the statement of
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the Crawford Court argued that “[r]eliability is an amorphous,
if not entirely subjective, concept,”93 such that the Roberts test
is “permanently” unpredictable and does not adequately
conform to the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.94 Thus,
despite the criticism of the Crawford majority’s originalist
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, commentators have
praised the majority’s “more principled” approach.95
The applicability and necessity of cross-examination
have also been recognized in the context of civil and
administrative hearings, grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clauses.96 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required “the opportunity to be heard;”
that is, a hearing “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.”97 Additionally, the Court noted that “[i]n almost every
setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact,
due process requires an opportunity to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses.”98 Later, in Mathews v. Eldridge,
the Court further clarified the Goldberg standard in the
context of the Fifth Amendment, creating a test under which
courts balance three factors to determine whether procedural
safeguards in a given case are sufficient; namely, (1) “the
Cobham put before a grand jury would differ significantly in the content from the
accusation he made against Sir Walter Raleigh. The prosecutor has an incentive to
lean on the prospective witness to shape the grand jury testimony in accordance with
the prosecution’s theory of the case in order to secure an indictment and to freeze the
witness’s story as much as possible.”).
93
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
94
Id. at 68 n.10.
95
Robert M. Pitler, Symposium, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future
of the Confrontation Clause in Light of its Past: Introduction, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3334 (2005) (“[M]uch to its credit, the Crawford majority focuses on statements secured
by law enforcement interrogation of individuals who respond with testimony-bearing
statements. The introduction of such statements at trial and the defendant’s inability
to cross-examine the absent declarant are a core concern of the Confrontation Clause.
Thus, centering analysis on practices that are modern-day counterparts to the abuses
targeted by the Clause is particularly appropriate . . . . [T]he categorical exclusion of
testimonial statements absent cross-examination of the declarant surely should prove a
more principled, and less subjective approach than, and without the ‘unpardonable
vice’ of, the Roberts indicia of reliability framework.”); Roger C. Park, Purpose as a
Guide to the Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 297, 297
(2005) (“I applaud the change from Ohio v. Roberts to Crawford v. Washington[.]”).
96
U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV § 1.
97
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68 (1970) (explaining that in the context of
termination of benefits, an administrative procedure, such as a hearing, requires
“timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an
effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting
his own arguments and evidence orally.”) (emphasis added).
98
Id. at 269.
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private interest that will be affected by official action;” (2) “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”99 As such, whether or not
a strict, incarceratory liberty interest is involved, the American
system constitutionally recognizes the need for confrontation
and cross-examination in judicial proceedings.
b. Statutory and Policy-based Protections
Defendants’ rights are also protected through statutory
and contractual provisions designed to ensure witness truthtelling.100 First, the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Federal Rules”)
provide a number of protections for defendants in criminal and
civil cases, including (1) a requirement that all witnesses must
swear or affirm to “testify truthfully,”101 and (2) rules bearing on
hearsay testimony, which bar out-of-court statements offered
for the truth of those statements absent one of the enumerated
exceptions to or exemptions from the Federal Rules.102
Furthermore, non-evidentiary statutory law prohibits perjury,
the making of false statements or declarations, actions in
contempt of court, and obstruction of justice.103 Lastly, in the
cartel enforcement context, the Division’s leniency agreements
include contractual requirements of witness appearance and
truthfulness as conditions of leniency.104 The practical effect of
these statutory rules and contractual provisions in the context
99

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 401-02, 1503 1621, 1623 (2006).
101
FED. R. OF EVID. 603 (“Before testifying, every witness shall be required to
declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken the witness’ conscience and impress the witness’ mind with
the duty to do so.”).
102
FED. R. EVID. 801-07.
103
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402, 1503 1621, 1623.
104
For example, the Division’s Model Conditional Leniency Agreements note
that witnesses:
100

when called upon to do so by the United States, [testify] in trial and grand
jury or other proceedings in the United States, fully, truthfully, and under
oath, subject to the penalties of perjury (18 U.S.C. § 1621), making false
statements or declarations in grand jury or court proceedings (18 U.S.C.
§ 1623), contempt (18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402), and obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C.
§ 1503-1521), in connection with the anticompetitive activity being reported.
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of the Division’s leniency program is to strongly discourage
leniency applicants from providing false or misleading
testimony, to penalize those corporations and individuals who
seek to obtain leniency or punish co-conspirators through
dishonesty, and to ensure compliance with the abovementioned
constitutional
provisions,
including
the
Confrontation Clause.105 In fact, the Division has used allegedly
untruthful statements as a basis for revoking conditional
leniency, as in the case of United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A.106
However, the true lesson of Stolt-Nielsen lies in its revelation of
both the pervasiveness of witness dishonesty and the necessity
of a right of confrontation in cartel proceedings.
c. The Case of United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A.
The necessity for the right of a defendant to confront
adverse witnesses has been demonstrated clearly and recently
in the cartel enforcement context. In 2003, the Antitrust
Division revoked conditional leniency from Stolt-Nielsen S.A., a
Norwegian company involved in a cartel within the bulk
chemical shipping industry.107 The Division’s revocation was
grounded in the allegations of co-conspirators who had been
successfully prosecuted on the basis of evidence contained
within Stolt-Nielsen’s leniency application to U.S. antitrust
authorities.108 These co-conspirators alleged that Stolt-Nielsen
had failed to take “prompt and effective action” to terminate its
involvement in the conspiracy after it first discovered the anticompetitive activity.109 Following a series of civil proceedings
challenging the revocation of leniency,110 the Division indicted
Stolt-Nielsen for its self-reported Sherman Act violations.111
However, the district court dismissed the indictment, finding
after an evidentiary hearing that the Division’s allegations that
Stolt-Nielsen breached the leniency agreement were meritless,

105

Hammond, Summary Overview, supra note 49, at 5.
United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
107
Id. at 614.
108
Id. at 614, 623.
109
Id. at 616.
110
Stolt-Nielsen had successfully sought to enjoin the Division from revoking
leniency. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 553, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
However, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
United States, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006), after which the Division filed its
indictment.
111
Stolt-Nielsen, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
106
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and therefore that the Division’s revocation of leniency and
subsequent prosecution was improper.112 Importantly, the court
found that the testimony of the Division’s witnesses—the
cooperating co-conspirators—lacked credibility.113
First, the court noted that each of the witnesses had a
strong motive to lie to the Division in exchange for leniency in
their own criminal sentences.114 Second, when confronted on
cross-examination, the witnesses’ were not credible and were
repeatedly impeached.115 The Division witnesses’ testimonies
were
self-contradictory
and
riddled
with
material
misstatements of fact, which appeared both in the live
testimony and in sworn grand jury statements.116 Absent the
right to cross-examine these government witnesses, it is
unlikely that Stolt-Nielsen would have been able to prevail in
its motion, and could have faced extraordinary fines and prison
terms based almost entirely on the false testimony of its coconspirators.117 The case of Stolt-Nielsen highlights the acute
danger of using the out-of-court statements of co-conspirators—
even when sworn—to establish cartel violations, as well as the
unassailable value of cross-examination in the antitrust
context.
112

Id. at 628.
Id. at 623.
114
Id. (“Each witness . . . had a strong motive to seek leniency from the
Division and to retaliate against a competitor that had implicated him in a criminal
conspiracy.”).
115
Id. at 623-27. When discussing the credibility of co-conspirator Hugo
Finlay, the court noted that he “was impeached repeatedly with prior inconsistent
sworn testimony,” first denying knowledge of the conspiracy “despite the fact that he
had actively participated in it.” Id. at 624. In addition, when confronted about
allegations he had made with regard to an anticompetitive quid pro quo agreement,
Finlay “conceded on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge of such a
quid pro quo.” Id. With respect to another co-conspirator witness, Jarle Haugsdal, the
court noted that Haugsdal had “provided repeated false accounts” about his company’s
role in the conspiracy in his plea agreement, and that his “sworn grand jury
declaration . . . was replete with material misstatements of fact.” Id. at 624-25.
Furthermore, “[w]hen confronted with the inconsistencies, Haugsdal was uncertain
how or by whom his declaration was prepared.” Id. at 625. Moreover, while cooperating
witness Erik Nielsen testified “[o]n direct examination . . . that Stolt-Nielsen continued
to participate in the conspiracy after [it discovered the anticompetitive conduct], when
confronted with examples of vigorous post-March 2002 competition, Nielsen conceded
that it was not ‘business as usual,’ [i.e. anticompetitive,] and repeatedly disavowed
familiarity with the business,” stating that he “‘was not involved at all,’” and “‘not
familiar at all with these matters.’” Id. at 626. Finally, and most incredibly, one
cooperating witness, Bjorn Sjaastad, stated that “he was not aware that his conduct
was illegal until he read [a newspaper] article reporting on antitrust violations in the
parcel-tanker industry.” Id.
116
See id. at 623-27.
117
Id. at 623.
113
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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION APPROACH TO CARTEL
ENFORCEMENT

Similarly to the United States, the EU has had a
significant history of cartel enforcement, animated from the
start by the need to protect the European common market.118
Cartel enforcement falls within the purview of the EC, an
“integrated” administrative agency within the EU that
performs its own investigations, regulatory enforcement, and
adjudications.119 Investigations typically begin either with a
customer complaint sent to the EC,120 ex officio,121 or through an
application for leniency.122 The investigatory stage of cartel
enforcement in the EC is conducted by the Directorate General
for Competition (“DG Competition”).123 These investigations use
aggressive techniques inspired by American criminal cartel
enforcement, and increasingly rely on oral evidence gathered in
leniency applications and raids on targeted individuals and
businesses.124 Upon a determination that there is sufficient
evidence to prosecute undertaking party, the DG Competition
case team prepares a “Statement of Objections,” which outlines
the factual bases for the violation alleged.125
The filing of a Statement of Objections triggers a series
of procedural “rights of defense” for the alleged infringers,
including the “right of access” to the DG Competition case file
118

Directorate General for Competition, European Commission, http://ec.
europa.eu/dgs/competition/mission/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) (“The mission of the
Directorate General for Competition (DG Competition) is to enable the Commission to
make markets deliver more benefits to consumers, businesses and the society as a
whole, by protecting competition on the market and fostering a competition culture. We
do this through the enforcement of competition rules and through actions aimed at
ensuring that regulation takes competition duly into account among other public policy
interests.”).
119
Michael Trebilcock & Edward Iacobucci, Designing Competition Law
Institutions, 25 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 361, 380-83 (2002).
120
DG COMPETITION, BEST PRACTICES ON THE CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGS
CONCERNING ARTICLES 101 and 102 TFEU 6 (2010), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
consultations/2010_best_practices/best_practice_articles.pdf [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES].
121
Id. at 6-7 (“The Commission may also open a case on its own initiative (ex
officio), for instance when certain facts have been brought to its attention, or further to
information gathered in the context of sector enquiries, informal meetings with
industry or the monitoring of markets, or on the basis of information exchanged within
the European Competition Network . . . .”).
122
Id. at 7.
123
BEST PRACTICES, supra note 120, at 6-17; Aslam & Ramsden, supra note 7,
at 61; VAN BAEL & BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY § 10.10
(2004).
124
Forrester, supra note 7, at 833.
125
BEST PRACTICES, supra note 120, at 18.
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and the “right to be heard” by the Commission.126 The primary
catalysts for these procedural developments have come from
common law Member States, the United States, and the
European appellate courts, specifically the Court of First
Instance (“CFI”)127 and the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).128
Ultimately, these procedural rights were formalized in EC
Regulations 1/2003 and 773/2004, which represent a
convergence of the procedural safeguards in the EU and those
of adversarial criminal justice systems in the United States
and elsewhere.129 However, despite the fact that the EC has
continually improved the defensive rights of accused entities, it
has neglected to impose one fundamental and necessary right:
the right of confrontation.130
A.

Competition Law and Procedure in the EU

The EU prohibits anticompetitive conduct in Article 101
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”).131 Specifically, Article 101(1) prohibits “all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade
between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the internal market.”132 An “undertaking,” for the
purposes of Article 101, covers a broad array of entities,

126

Michael Asimow & Lisl Dunlop, The Many Faces of Administrative
Adjudication in the European Union, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 144 (2009); David E.
Shipley, Due Process Rights Before EU Agencies: The Rights of Defense, 37 GA. J. INT’L
L. 1, 32 (2008) (“The formal commencement of a procedure by the communication of a
statement of objections triggers the right to be heard . . . .”).
127
With the passage of the Lisbon Treaty, the CFI is now entitled the
“General Court;” however, because the pre-Lisbon decisions and authorities cited here
refer to the “CFI,” this note will refer to the court by its former name. See Treaty of
Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, art. 2, O.J. C 306/1, at 43
(2007).
128
EC decisions are subject to judicial review by the CFI on issues of fact and
law, and further subject to legal review before the ECJ. Carl Baudenbacher,
Judicialization of European Competition Policy, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 354
(B. Hawk, ed. 2003); Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, at 146.
129
Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, at 144.
130
IAN S. FORRESTER & ASSIMAKIS P. KOMNINOS, AM. BAR ASSOC. EUROPEAN
UNION ADMIN. LAW PROJECT, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: COMPETITION LAW ADJUDICATION
63, http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/eu/SectRptAdj-Competition--Komninos_spring2006.pdf.
131
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 8, at 88.
132
Id.
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including all legal and natural persons participating in
economic or commercial activity.133
Regulation 1/2003 sets forth the rules related to the
enforcement of Article 101, and delegates enforcement
responsibility both to the EC through the DG Competition and
to Member States of the European Union.134 Under this
regulation, the EC has the authority to “impose on [infringing
undertakings] any behavioral or structural remedies which are
proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to
bring the infringement to an end.”135 The EC is also authorized
through Regulation 1/2003 to impose penalties—specifically
and exclusively fines136—on offending undertakings.137 These
fines have exceeded 13 billion euros over the last 15 years.138
Finally, under Article 230(1) of the EC Treaty, decisions made

133

See Simon Holmes & Philipp Girardet, European Union, THE INT’L COMP.
LEGAL GUIDE TO CARTELS & LENIENCY 66, 66 (2009).
134
Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 11-24, O.J. L 1/1, at 10-18 (2003) [hereinafter
Regulation 1/2003].
135
Id. at 9. However, before the Commission may issue a decision regarding
an undertaking, it must consult the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and
Dominant Positions (the “Advisory Committee”), which is comprised of representatives
of Member States and prepares opinions on draft Commission decisions. The
Commission must consider the opinions of the Advisory Committee with the “utmost
account” in preparing a final decision. Id.
136
Baudenbacher, supra note 128, at 354. In fact, the Commission has
asserted its non-criminal character expressly “because it did not want Article 6 of the
European Human Rights convention to be applied to it.” Id. Under Article 6 of the
ECHR:
[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly . . . of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be
given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have
examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him; [and] (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter
if he cannot understand or speak the language of the court.
Slater et al., supra note 7, at 4 n.10.
137
The regulation states that the Commission may impose fines up to 10% of
the undertaking’s “total turnover” in the previous business year in the event that the
undertaking has infringed Article 101 or contravened an “interim measure” imposed
upon the undertaking, or if the undertaking has failed to comply with a commitment it
has made in response to a preliminary finding of infringement. Regulation 1/2003,
supra note 134, art. 23, at 16-17.
138
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, OFFICIAL STATISTICS ON EC FINES [hereinafter EC
FINE STATISTICS], available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/
statistics.pdf (last updated Oct. 7, 2009).
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by the EC are subject to appellate judicial review by the CFI
and ECJ.139
B.

Sources of Oral Evidence in EC Cartel Cases

The EC utilizes a multifarious approach to investigation
and evidence-gathering that is heavily influenced by the
American model.140 While in the past the Commission’s evidence
was limited, to a large extent, to documentary evidence, its
modern approach increasingly relies on oral evidence gathered
from (1) the EC Leniency Program and (2) its investigations. As
explained below, this modern approach bears heavily on the
adequacy of EC procedural fairness.
1. The EC Leniency Program and Paperless
Applications
The first source of oral evidence in EC cartel cases
arises in the form of oral applications for leniency, which were
introduced in the EC’s 2002 revision to its 1996 Leniency
Program.141 The program was revised in 2002 and then again in
2006 “because [the EC] wanted it to be more attractive and . . .
closer to the American program.”142 The current leniency
program—outlined in the EC’s “Leniency Notice”—provides
conditional immunity from fines to the first undertaking that
approaches the Commission with evidence of cartel activity.143
This evidence must be in the form of a corporate statement
that is sufficient to allow the Commission (1) to “carry out a
targeted inspection in connection with the alleged cartel”
(“Point 8(a) Immunity”),144 or (2) to “find an infringement of

139

See Holmes & Girardet, supra note 133, at 67.
International Cartels Roundtable, supra note 19, at 100.
141
Joshua, supra note 26, at 16.
142
International Cartels Roundtable, supra note 19, at 100; see WILLIAM E.
KOVACIC, FTC, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY 166
n.799 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/workshops/ftc100/docs/ftc100rpt.pdf
(last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
143
Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel
Cases, ¶ 8(a), 2006 O.J. (C 298) 18 [hereinafter Commission Notice], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:298:0017:0022:EN:PDF.
144
Id. ¶ 8(a). In order to qualify for Point 8(a) Immunity, the applying
undertaking must approach the Commission before it has “sufficient evidence to adopt
a decision to carry out an inspection in connection with the alleged cartel or had
already carried out such an inspection.” Id. ¶ 10. Furthermore, the leniency notice
provides that an applicant for 8(a) Immunity must provide the Commission with (a)
140
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Article [101 TFEU] in connection with the alleged cartel”
(“Point 8(b) Immunity”).145 Additionally, the Leniency Notice
provides fine reduction for subsequent applicants that provide
“significant added value” to the EC’s investigation, defining
“added value” with reference to “the extent to which the
evidence provided strengthens, by its very nature and/or its
level of detail, the Commission’s ability to prove the alleged
cartel.”146 As in the United States, all applicants must meet a
series of preconditions designed to ensure cooperation with the
EC, evidence preservation, and effective and immediate
withdrawal from the conspiracy.147
Corporate statements made for leniency purposes may
be submitted either in written or oral form.148 Oral statements
were first allowed in the 2002 revision to the Leniency Notice,
a modification encouraged by American lawyers as a means of
protecting applicants from U.S. civil antitrust lawsuits brought
by customers, indirect purchasers, consumers, and others.149 In
evidence in the form of a “corporate statement” and (b) other evidence, including
contemporaneous evidence of the conspiracy available to the applicant. Id. ¶ 9.
145
Id. ¶ 8(b). Where the EC has already initiated an investigation into cartel
conduct without recourse to a Point 8(a) Immunity applicant, a cartel participant may
qualify for Point 8(b) Immunity if it is “the first to provide contemporaneous,
incriminating evidence of the alleged cartel as well as a corporate statement containing
the kind of information . . . which would enable the Commission to find an
infringement of Article [101 TFEU].” Id. ¶ 11.
146
Id. ¶ 25, at 20.
147
Id. ¶ 12, at 18. First, the applicant must cooperate “genuinely, fully, on a
continuous basis and expeditiously from the time it submits its application throughout
the Commission’s administrative procedure.” Id. ¶ 12(a). Second, the applicant must
have ended “its involvement in the alleged cartel immediately following its application,
except for what would, in the Commission’s view, be reasonably necessary to preserve
the integrity of the inspections.” Id. ¶ 12(b), at 19. Third, the applicant “must not have
destroyed, falsified or concealed evidence of the alleged cartel nor disclosed the fact or
any of the content of its contemplated application, except to other competition
authorities.” Id. ¶ 12(c). The last requirement outlined in the Leniency Notice concerns
the applicant’s role within the cartel; namely, the applicant must not have coerced any
other co-conspirator to join or remain a part of the cartel. Id. ¶ 13.
148
Id. ¶ 9(a), at 18 n.2.
149
Bertus van Barlingen & Marc Barennes, The European Commission’s 2002
Leniency Notice in Practice, 3 EUR. COMPETITION NEWSL. 6, 8 (2005) (“[T]he
Commission allows [oral leniency applications] . . . in order to ensure that by making
an application under the Commission’s Leniency Notice, undertakings are not worse off
than non-cooperating cartel members in respect of civil procedures for damages.”);
Joshua, supra note 26, at 14 (explaining that “[t]he exposure arises from the
mathematical certainty that any announcement of an antitrust investigation in the US
will trigger a welter of expensive and burdensome treble damages claims.”); 2003
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST 120 (ed. Barry Hawk 2004) (As Olivier Guersent, the former
DG Competition noted, “[W]hat we want to protect from discovery is this very
incriminating document that the applicants assemble for the Commission, and that is
basically a roadmap to these documents. . . . We do believe these types of document
[sic] should not be disclosed in civil trials because if they are, then they unbalance the
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this so-called “paperless” procedure, the applicant or its
attorneys may recite the relevant facts required for leniency
onto a tape, which becomes “original evidence” added to the
investigation file.150 After the applicant delivers its oral
testimony, it will be “granted the opportunity to check the
technical accuracy of the recording, which will be available at
the Commission’s premises[,] and to correct the substance of
their oral statements within a given time limit.”151 The EC
shields the oral statement transcripts from discovery during
the course of the investigation, and maintains unattested
transcripts as an “internal resource” such that they are not
discoverable either with the Statement of Objections or to civil
plaintiffs.152 However, while protected from civil discovery,
these oral statements are considered “evidence” in cartel cases
against co-conspirators,153 a policy recognized both by the CFI154
and by the EC.155 Furthermore, and as more fully explicated
below, Regulation No. 1/2003 allows EC competition case teams
to “interview any natural or legal person who consents to be
interviewed for the purpose of collecting information relating to
the subject-matter of an investigation,” including interviews
during the course of the leniency application process.156
However, these interviews are strictly voluntary, and the EC
may not require individuals to give testimony under oath.157
trial extremely severely, and it acts as an extreme disincentive to apply for immunity
in the European Union.”).
150
van Barlingen & Berennes, supra note 149, at 10. Originally, however, the
oral statements were designed solely to gather “dawn raid sufficient” information.
Julian Joshua, The European Cartel Enforcement Regime Post-Modernization: How is it
Working?, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1247, 1262 (2006) (“In the EC, however, the oral
process has slipped from the provision of information sufficient to trigger a raid—that
is, the information gathered is used as no more than a road map to the evidence—to
being treated by the Commission as itself conclusive evidence of the violation.”).
151
Commission Notice, supra note 143, ¶ 32.
152
Joshua, supra note 26, at 15.
153
van Barlingen & Berennes, supra note 149, at 8; Joshua, supra note 26, at 17.
154
JFE Eng’g Corp. v. Comm’n, Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 & T78/00, 2004 E.C.R. II-2514, 2587 ¶ 192 (noting that “no provision or any general
principle of Community law prohibits the Commission from relying, as against an
undertaking, on statements made by other incriminated undertakings”). Specifically
related to oral statements, the court—deciding the issue based on the 1996 Leniency
Notice—stated that informational evidence “need not necessarily be provided in
documentary form.” Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd. v. Comm’n, Joined Cases T-236/01, T239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 & T-252/01, 2004 E.C.R. II-1181, ¶ 431.
155
van Barlingen & Berennes, supra note 149, at 9.
156
Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 19(1), at 14.
157
BEST PRACTICES, supra note 120, at 12; Koen Lenaerts, Some Thoughts on
Evidence and Procedure in European Community Competition Law, 30 FORDHAM INT’L
L. J. 1463, 1469 (2007); Council Regulation No. 773, art. 3, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 20.
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Thus, the leniency program involves two species of oral
evidence, the applications and the interviews, neither of which
is sworn or subject to cross-examination.158
2. Investigation and Oral Interviews
The second source of oral evidence in EC cartel cases
arises from investigations into alleged violations of European
competition laws, as authorized under Regulation 1/2003.159
First, where the EC has reason to believe that there is a
distortion or restriction in the common market, it may
investigate any specific industry or market with respect to the
apparent distortion or restriction, and may request any
necessary
information
from
undertakings,
including
information related to “all agreements, decisions and concerted
practices.”160 Additionally, the EC may, by request or decision,
“require undertakings and associations of undertakings to
provide all necessary information” to assist with the
investigation.161 In the event that an undertaking provides false
or misleading information, or does not provide the requested
information within the prescribed time limit, the undertaking
may face a fine of up to 1% of its “total turnover in the
preceding business year . . . .”162
In practice, a team led by a DG Competition case
manager will conduct the investigation into the alleged
violations, which may include either a document request or a
“dawn raid” on a targeted business.163 Increasingly,
investigations are spurred by leniency applications, which
require “dawn raid sufficient” evidence.164 During the course of
158

Lenaerts, supra note 157, at 1468-69 (“The Commission is entitled to rely
on these submissions in order to establish the existence of an infringement. Since the
principle is that the evaluation of evidence should be unfettered, this type of evidence
is admissible under Community competition law. However, in the administrative
procedure, the Commission does not have the power ‘to compel persons to give evidence
under oath.’”) (quoting Rhône-Poulenc SA, 1991 E.C.R. II-867, II-954) (Vesterdorf, J.).
159
Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 17-22, at 13-16.
160
Id. art. 17, at 13.
161
Id. art. 18(1), at 13.
162
Id. art. 23(1)(a)-(b), at 16.
163
A dawn raid is an early morning, “on-the-spot” investigation of a business
office or private residence conducted by EC officials—at times with the assistance of
law enforcement from the member state—pursuant to Regulation 1/2003 Articles 18
through 21. See Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, at 156; Imran Aslam & Michael
Ramsden, EC Dawn Raids: A Human Rights Violation?, 5 COMPETITION L. REV. 61, 6567 (2008); Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 18-21, at 13-16.
164
Joshua, supra note 9, at 4.
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an investigation, “the Commission may interview any natural
or legal person who consents to be interviewed for the purpose
of collecting information relating to the subject-matter of an
investigation.”165 Further, the case team may ask individuals to
provide voluntary oral explanations of the documentary
evidence it collects in connection with the dawn raids,166 which
may include searches of businesses, residences, and
automobiles.167 The testimonial evidence gathered in these
interviews and explanations may be used as evidence in the
Statement of Objections, and is not sworn or subject to crossexamination.168
C.

Procedural Safeguards in the EC

In the event that the DG Competition case team
discovers violations in the course of an investigation, it may
seek approval from the Legal Service and the Competition
Commissioner, as well as a committee of European Member
States, to outline a “Statement of Objections,” which includes
(1) the charges against the undertaking and (2) the time limit
for the undertaking to respond to the allegations.169 Upon the
filing of a Statement of Objections, the undertaking is afforded
a series of procedural rights, including (1) the right to access
the Commission’s file against the undertaking170 and (2) the
right to be heard in writing or at an oral hearing.171
1. The Right of Access to File
Parties subject to a Statement of Objections are
“entitled to have access to the Commission’s file,” excepting
business secrets and confidential information such as internal
documents prepared by the EC and Member States of the EU.172
The right of access was first articulated in Solvay v.
Commission, in which the CFI explained the purpose of the
right; namely, “to enable addressees of statements of objections
165
166
167
168
169

Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 19(1), at 14.
Lenaerts, supra note 157, at 1469.
Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 20-21, at 14-15.
Id.
BEST PRACTICES, supra note 120, at 18-19; Asimow & Dunlop, supra note

126, at 156.
170
171
172

Shipley, supra note 1, at 39-43.
Id. at 36-39.
Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 27(2), at 19.
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to examine evidence in the Commission’s file so that they are in
a position effectively to express their views on the conclusions
reached by the Commission in its statement of objections on
the basis of that evidence.”173 Furthermore, the Court outlined
the “equality of arms” principle, which states that the
information available to the Commission and the undertaking
at issue must be equal.174
2. The Right to Be Heard
The right to be heard was first outlined in Transocean
Marine Paint Ass’n v. Commission, where the CFI noted that “a
person whose interests are perceptibly affected by a [d]ecision
taken by a public authority must be given the opportunity to
make his point of view known.”175 Later, in Hoffmann-La Roche
& Co. v. Commission, the CFI generalized the procedural rights
of undertakings, stating that “the undertakings concerned
must have been afforded the opportunity during the
administrative procedure to make known their views on the
truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and
on the documents used by the Commission to support its claim”
of infringement.176 The right to be heard is now formalized in
Regulation 1/2003, which requires that, prior to making a
decision with respect to an alleged violation of TFEU Article
101, the Commission must give the alleged violators an
“opportunity to be heard” on the matters set forth in the
Statement of Objections.177
Oral hearings are conducted by a Hearing Officer
independent of the investigative team.178 The CFI has held that
173
174
175

Case T-30/91, Solvay SA v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. II-1775, 1802.
Shipley, supra note 1, at 40.
Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Ass’n v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 1062,

1079-80.
176

Case 85/76, Hoffmann-Law Roche & Co. v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 512.
The hearing procedures themselves are more fully explained in a
subsequent, clarifying regulation, Regulation 773/2004, which states that the parties
must be given an “opportunity to develop their arguments at an oral hearing” prior to
the Commission consulting with the Advisory Committee. Commission Regulation No.
773/2004, art. 12, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 21 (EC) [hereinafter Regulation 773/2004];
Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 12, at 19; Joined Cases 100-103/80, SA Musique
Diffusion Francaise v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 1825, 1881-84; Shipley, supra note 1, at
36.
178
Regulation 773/2004, supra note 177, art. 14(1), at 21 (“Hearings shall be
conducted by a Hearing Officer in full independence.”); Committee Decision of 23 May
2001 on the Terms of Reference of Hearing Officers in Certain Competition Proceedings,
2001 O.J. (L 162) 21 (“The conduct of administrative proceedings should therefore be
177
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these hearings are “adversarial” in nature, and each hearing
generally follows these steps: (1) the Commission presents its
case, (2) the defending parties and any relevant third parties
present their case in response to the statement of objections, (3)
representatives of the Member States and the Commission may
ask questions regarding the arguments presented in the
defending parties’ presentations, and (4) the Hearing Officer
may provide the parties with an opportunity to make brief,
concluding remarks relating to issues previously discussed
during the hearing.179 Additionally, EC competition hearings
are recorded.180
During its presentation to the Commission, a defending
party has the right to submit testimony in response to the
Statement of Objections, may call on its own fact and expert
witnesses, and may submit questions to the Hearing Officer,
who then has the discretion to put the questions to Commission
witnesses.181 However, unlike in adversarial systems such as
the United States, parties in hearings before the European
Commission “do not have the right to cross-examine the
Commission, other parties (co-defendants) or third persons
whose testimony is heard at the hearing,” and “[t]he
Commission does not cross-examine the parties, but it may
question them after the presentation with respect to their oral

entrusted to an independent person experienced in competition matters who has the
integrity necessary to contribute to the objectivity, transparency and efficiency of those
proceedings.”). As the EC states:
The hearing officer brings a new pair of eyes to trade proceedings and is fully
impartial. As an official of DG Trade experienced in trade issues, he has a
thorough knowledge of the system from the inside, but is not involved in
ongoing investigations or conducting trade proceedings himself. The hearing
officer is independent from the Commission investigators and receives no
instructions from them about his substantial role.
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR TRADE, EUROPEAN COMM’N, HEARING OFFICER PRACTICAL
INFORMATION, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/hearingofficer/practical-information/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2010); see also
Forrester, supra note 7, at 834.
179
See DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMPETITION, EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE
HEARING OFFICERS: GUIDANCE ON PROCEDURES OF THE HEARING OFFICERS IN PROCEEDINGS
RELATING TO ARTICLES 101 AND 102 TFEU (EX- ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC) 11-15 (2010)
[hereinafter
DG
COMPETITION,
THE
HEARING
OFFICERS],
http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/hearing_officers.pdf; see also Forrester &
Komninos, supra note 130, at 61; Regulation 773/2004, supra note 177, art. 14, at 21-22.
180
THE HEARING OFFICER, EUROPEAN COMM’N, INFORMATION ON THE ORAL
HEARING TO WHICH YOU ARE INVITED 3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
hearing_officers/info2.pdf (last visited June 26, 2010).
181
Forrester & Komninos, supra note 130, at 61.
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submissions.”182 After the hearing, the Hearing Officer is
responsible for preparing an interim and final report183 for the
College of Commissioners, which then decides whether to
impose penalties on the defending undertaking.184 Thus, while
“[t]he procedure in [EC competition cases] comes very close to
the full evidentiary hearing of the type required by . . .
Goldberg v. Kelly,” the lack of cross-examination—especially
given the increasing use of oral evidence—highlights the
inadequacy of the present safeguards.185
III.

TRENDS IN EC CARTEL ENFORCEMENT TOWARD A
CRIMINAL AND ADVERSARIAL MODEL, AND THE FAILURE
TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

The current state of EC cartel enforcement, as outlined
above, represents the latest stage in an “important
evolutionary process” with respect to its administrative
procedure—one that has brought it strikingly close to the
American model and now demands an attendant right to
confrontation.186 First, as investigations have become more
aggressive and fines have increased, the EC cartel enforcement
regime has become increasingly “criminalized.”187 Second, EC
procedures have become increasingly “judicialized,” adopting
structures to provide independence of decision-making and to
sever the oft-criticized role of the EC as investigator,
prosecutor, and judge.188 Third, as the EC has developed its
procedures, there has been an increase in procedural rights
182

Id. at 63.
These reports relate to both procedural and substantive issues, including
whether the rights of defense were respected in the hearing and the Hearing Officer’s
substantive observations on the course of the proceedings. DG COMPETITION, THE
HEARING OFFICERS, supra note 179, at 16-17.
184
Governance Statement of the European Commission 2 (May 30, 2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/doc/governance_statement_en.pdf.
185
Julian M. Joshua, The Right to be Heard in EEC Competition Procedures,
15 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 16, 57 (1991).
186
Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, at 143-44; Philip Marsden & Peter
Whelan, Re-Examining Trans-Atlantic Similarities and Divergences in Substantive and
Procedural Competition Law, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 23, 23 (2009).
187
Forrester, supra note 7, at 834 (“We have come a long way since the early
days of EC competition law, when cases were carefully picked, decisions were few and
penalties were modest. The regime had been set up in 1962, it was a relatively obscure
topic, and the fines were not confiscatory though they could, in theory, be painful.”); see
also Aslam & Ramsden, supra note 7, at 61-62; Slater, Thomas & Waelbroeck, supra
note 7, at 4, 11.
188
Forrester, supra note 7, at 830; see also Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126,
at 157; Lenaerts, supra note 157, at 1474; Shipley, supra note 1, at 14.
183

1518

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4

afforded to private parties before the EC.189 However, the
advent of oral leniency applications in the EC in 2002 and the
increasing use of oral evidence in EC competition proceedings
raise a number of questions about the sufficiency of extant
procedural protections.190 The credibility of oral leniency
applicants is especially lacking because those individuals and
corporations have a strong interest in embellishing the role of
co-conspirators while minimizing the extent of their own
participation in the cartel.191 Furthermore, the lack of
procedures for confrontation and cross-examination in EC
proceedings threatens the integrity of the entire fact-finding
process,192 since “hearsay accounts given by lawyers fall short of
any generally accepted evidential standards, especially if they
are the only proof adduced by the Commission.”193 While some
commentators argue that the protections in the European
Union adequately provide procedural fairness,194 others are not
convinced.195 To secure procedural rights for corporations, and
in light of the implementation of the oral leniency application,
this note proposes that the EC should adopt a Crawford v.
Washington-based approach196 to confrontational rights.
Adopting this approach will serve a vital, legitimating function
in a system where policy changes have outpaced procedural
adaptations.
A.

Criminalization of EC Cartel Enforcement

The EC’s cartel enforcement regime has appropriated
elements of American cartel enforcement since its inception.197

189

Francesca Bignami, Creating European Rights: National Values and
Supranational Interests, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241, 279 (2005); Lenaerts, supra note
157, at 1474; Wils, supra note 19, at 128.
190
Joshua, supra note 9, at 1; Lenaerts, supra note 157, at 1474-94
(describing existent procedural protections in European Community Competition Law).
191
Forrester, supra note 7, at 833 (“Leniency applicants have a clear interest
in showing serious wrongdoing by their competitors. The juicier the information they
provide, the more chance they have of being deemed to have provided ‘significant added
value’ and obtaining a reduction in their fine, or total immunity; and, in the process,
they will have created big trouble for their competitors.”); Joshua, supra note 9, at 7.
192
Joshua, supra note 9, at 6.
193
Id. at 16.
194
Shipley, supra note 1, at 48.
195
Joshua, supra note 9, at 1.
196
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
197
Nicholas Green QC, The Road to Conviction—The Criminalisation of
Cartel Law, in 2003 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 000, 28 (B. Hawk, ed. 2004) (though
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When the European Union crafted the Treaty of Rome198 in
1957, it “took as its inspiration for Articles 85 and 86EC,
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.”199 This influence extends
to the means of investigation employed by the EC in cartel
enforcement, as well as the ever-increasing fines that it levies
on violators.200
1. Criminalized Investigations
Over time, the European Commission has adopted many
of the investigatory techniques utilized by criminal
enforcement regimes like the United States, and sometimes
utilizes powers that go beyond those criminal systems.201 First,
the most invasive investigatory power of the European
Commission is the “dawn raid.”202 Under Regulation 1/2003, the
Commission has sweeping authority to conduct searches of
businesses, private residences, and private automobiles,
subject only to minimal oversight by national courts.203
Furthermore, when the Commission effectuates these searches,
it often utilizes the law enforcement mechanisms—including
search warrants—and police personnel of the EU Member
States.204 Some commentators have intimated that these
techniques were inspired by the U.S. antitrust authorities’
successful use of criminal search warrants to retrieve business
records from the homes of cartel participants.205 Irrespective of
their source, however, it is clear that the increasingly
aggressive EC investigations are closely aligned with criminal
law enforcement techniques used in the United States.206
Second, the Commission adopted a leniency program—a
tool that had traditionally been reserved for only the most
Green notes that the provisions were not “slavish[ly]” plagiarized from the Sherman
Act).
198
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-II), in TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off’l Pub. Off. 1987).
199
Green QC, supra note 197, at 28.
200
Chavez, supra note 30, at 824-25; Wils, supra note 19, at 14.
201
See Aslam & Ramsdem, supra note 163, at 65-67.
202
Id.
203
Id.; see also Holmes & Girardet, supra note 133, at 68.
204
Explanatory Note to an Authorisation to Conduct an Inspection in Execution
of a Commission Decision Under Article 20(4) of Council Regulation No 1/2003 (2008),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/explanatory_note.pdf.
205
Chavez, supra note 30, at 825.
206
Aslam & Ramsden, supra note 7, at 64-67.
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serious criminal conspiracies—in large measure as a result of
the successful American experiment with its program in the
criminal context.207 The EC further undertook to bring its
leniency program in line with the US model through its 2002
and 2006 revisions, in which the most notable amendments
involved the incorporation of confidentiality provisions and the
oral leniency procedure.208 These provisions, designed to protect
against disclosure in American civil litigation, brought the
program “closer to the U.S. regime that is based on oral
statements rather than written documents.”209 However, while
the American system safeguards defendants from the use of
these oral statements in trial through its entrenched
procedural defense rights, the oral statements in the EC
procedure only seemed to create “a number of new
problems/issues,” including: (1) “issues related to the
evidentiary value of recorded oral statements in Community
antitrust procedures” and (2) “issues related to the modalities
of exercise of the rights of defence of the other cartel
members.”210
2. Penalties Exhibit Criminal Qualities
The recent modernization efforts in EC cartel
enforcement were “triggered by the need to restore the
effectiveness of the fight against secret unlawful agreements.”211
One of the most significant ways the EC did this was to adopt
“a considerable increase in the level of fines imposed by the
Commission.”212 A CFI judge has noted that EC fines “have a
criminal law character,” such that, increasingly “parties’
submissions can only be understood with the help of the
terminology and concepts used in criminal law and
procedure.”213 While EC decisions against cartel participants
between 1969 and 1995 totaled 3.329 million euros (comprising
eighty cartel decisions), enforcement between 1996 and the end
207

Wils, supra note 19, at 127.
International Cartels Roundtable, supra note 19, at 100.
209
Olivier Guersent, The Fight Against Secret Horizontal Agreement in the EC
Competition Policy, in 2003 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 43, 54 (B. Hawk, ed. 2004);
International Cartels Roundtable, supra note 19, at 100.
210
Guersent, supra note 209, at 54.
211
Id. at 45.
212
Id. at 47; see also Marsden & Whelan, supra note 186, at 23.
213
Case T-1/89, Rhone-Poulenc SA v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. II-867, available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61989F0001:EN:NOT.
208
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of 2003 totaled 3.45 billion euros (comprising thirty decisions),
with fines exceeding 9 billion euros for the 2004 to 2009
timeframe (comprising 243 decisions).214 This trend toward
astronomical fines exhibits the increasingly punitive and quasicriminal character of EC cartel enforcement, heightening the
“relevance of general principles of substantive criminal law”
and its attendant procedural safeguards.215
Furthermore, Regulation 1/2003 provides for indirect
criminal penalties through the operation of the cartel
enforcement regimes of the Member States. Under Article 5 of
Regulation 1/2003, “[t]he competition authorities of the
Member States shall have the power to apply Articles [101] and
[102] of the [TFEU] in individual cases,” and they may take
decisions “imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any
other penalty provided for in their national law.”216 As a result
of this broad penalty authorization, Member States may levy
criminal sentences on corporations and individuals alike, and
such penalties have been extended in Ireland, Estonia, and the
United Kingdom.217 Thus, while these penalties are not directly
imposed or adjudicated by the Commission, their availability
through the Member States suggest that the Commission is
willing to accept the appropriateness of criminal consequences
for violations of EC competition laws.
3. EC Cartel Hearings Exhibit Important Adversarial
Qualities
At the procedural level, the trend in EU cartel
enforcement has been one toward a quasi-criminal, adversarial
system, replete with many—but not all—of the rights found in
adversarial systems.218 First, although the CFI has declined to
conclude that the Commission constitutes a “tribunal,” it
contains many of the same characteristics.219 Namely, it (1) is
established by law, (2) is permanent, (3) exercises compulsory
214
215
216

Guersent, supra note 209, at 48; see also EC FINE STATISTICS, supra note 138.
Lenaerts, supra note 157, at 1485.
Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 5, at 8-9; see also Wils, supra note

19, at 129.
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Wils, supra note 19, at 130.
Marsden & Whelan, supra note 186, at 40; Wils, supra note 19, at 15;
Baudenbacher, supra note 128, at 354; Julian Joshua, Attitudes to Anti-Trust
Enforcement in the EU and US: Dodging the Traffic Warden, or Respecting the Law?
(1995), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1995_044_en.html.
219
Forrester, supra note 7 at 831; Shipley, supra note 1, at 36.
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jurisdiction, (4) carries out inter partes proceedings,220 (5)
applies the rule of law with evidentiary standards,221 and (6) is,
in certain important ways, independent.222 For example, the role
of the Hearing Officer, who conducts EC competition hearings
and files reports regarding compliance with procedural rules,
severs the relationship between the investigating case team
and the decision-making College of Commissioners.223 This
division of roles creates delineated prosecutorial and judicial
functions, heightening the adversarial nature of the hearings
and providing “an independent guarantor of the fundamental
procedural rights of all parties.”224 Furthermore, the use of oral
evidence in EC hearings has increased, which, while
uncommon in inquisitorial hearings, stands as a hallmark of
Western adversarial systems.225 Based on the trend toward an
adversarial system, it is not surprising that there has been a
concomitant shift toward greater procedural rights in the EC.
B.

Trend toward Greater Procedural Rights in EC Cartel
Cases

Undertakings in EC competition hearings were afforded
very little by way of procedural rights at the inception of the
EC.226 However, over time there has been a significant increase
in the “rights of defence” for targeted undertakings, including
the right of “access to file” and the “right to be heard.”227
220

See sources cited supra note 219.
Guidance on Procedures, supra note 178, at 4. (“The Commission has to
conduct its competition proceedings fairly and objectively while respecting the parties’
procedural rights. The Hearing Officers are, first of all, guardians of fair proceedings
before the Commission. They safeguard the rights of defence of undertakings subject to
proceedings relating to Articles 101 and 102 (ex- articles 81 and 82) as well as the
procedural rights of . . . all . . . parties to the proceedings.”); Regulation No. 1/2003,
supra note 134.
222
DG COMPETITION, THE HEARING OFFICERS, supra note 179, at 5-6.;
Baudenbacher, supra note 128, at 355; Regulation No. 773/2004, supra note 179, art.
14(1), at 21 (“Hearings shall be conducted by a Hearing Officer in full independence.”).
223
DG COMPETITION, THE HEARING OFFICERS, supra note 178, at 6. The College of
Commissioners is comprised of representatives of member states who are “completely
independent in the performance of their duties[,] . . . neither seek[ing] nor tak[ing]
instructions from any government or from any other body.” Id. Governance Statement of the
European Commission 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/doc/governance_
statement_en.pdf; see also Regulation No. 773/2004, supra note 177, art. 14(1), at 21.
224
Baudenbacher, supra note 128, at 356.
225
Id. at 355.
226
Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, 143.
227
At first, the accession of rights was inspired in part by intense pressure
from the United Kingdom, which, having joined the EU, wanted to protect the
fundamental rights of its citizenry. Id. at 143-46.
221
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However, these procedural rights have almost exclusively
focused on rights exercised before and after the EC hearing,
and do not include a right to cross-examine witnesses.228
Certainly, in a purely inquisitorial system, confrontation is
much less necessary, both because an inquisitorial approach
takes power out of the hands of the individual parties and
because live, testimonial evidence bears much less weight than
documentary evidence.229 In the EC, however, the increasing
use of oral testimony and adversarial postures creates a
disjuncture between its substantive policies and procedural
protections.230 As such, where the starting place and crux of
high-stakes cartel enforcement is increasingly unsworn, ex
parte oral testimony used explicitly as evidence of collusive
conduct, procedural rights must include a right of
confrontation.231
IV.

TOWARD A RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION FOR EC
COMPETITION HEARINGS

While trends in EC cartel enforcement have kept pace
with global cartel enforcement with respect to investigation
and punishment, the EC has not made parallel strides in the
area of procedural protections.232 One fundamental right above
all is lacking in EC competition procedure: the right of
confrontation. The American constitutional right of a criminal
defendant to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him
provides a useful model for managing oral testimony that
would bring necessary procedural fairness to the EC cartel
enforcement regime.233

228

Forrester, supra note 7, at 831-32; Joshua, supra note 9, at 6-7; Philip
Lowe, Director General, DG Competition, Speech at the CRA Conference on Economic
Developments in Competition Law: Due Process in Antitrust, at 7 (Dec. 9, 2009),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2009_19_en.pdf.
229
Lenaerts, supra note 157, at 1469.
230
Forrester, supra note 7, at 831, 833.
231
Joshua, supra note 26, at 16 (“[H]earsay accounts given by lawyers fall
short of any generally accepted evidential standards, especially if they are the only
proof adduced by the Commission.”).
232
Marsden & Whelan, supra note 186, at 40.
233
For the purposes of this note, the Sixth Amendment Right of
Confrontation, and not the Due Process Clause (or Federal Trade Commission
administrative procedure), provides the correct analogy, based on the de facto
criminalization of cartel conduct in the EC and the increasingly formal and adversarial
nature of EC competition hearings.

1524

A.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4

The Necessity of a Right of Confrontation for EC
Competition Hearings

At the dawn of the adoption of the 2002 Leniency
Notice, which first allowed for oral leniency applications, Emil
Paulis, the former Director responsible for Policy and Strategic
Support at DG Competition, stated that because “EU
administrative proceedings [are] centered on an exchange of
written arguments[,] . . . it does not serve the parties to crossexamine the Commission.”234 Further, in 1991 the ECJ held
that—in the context of anonymous documents—the
Commission need only perform “an overall assessment of a
document’s probative value” to determine admissibility.235
However, because the evidence used in EC Competition
hearings is now so heavily based on oral testimony, the
document-based procedure of the past can no longer be credibly
relied upon as a justification for the denial of confrontational
rights.236
First, the use of oral leniency applications in the EC as
evidence of cartel conduct raises many of the hearsay and
credibility issues against which cross-examination is designed
to protect.237 Because cartels are inherently secretive, the
possibility of ferreting out and establishing infringement
absent a confession or oral explanation of incriminating
documents is often remote.238 At the same time, however, there
is a strong incentive for individuals and corporations to
embellish the conduct of co-conspirators in the leniency
application process in order to achieve “significant added
value,”239 and there is no direct right to test the accuracy of
those statements in EC oral hearings.240
234

Emil Paulis, Checks and Balances in the EU Antitrust Enforcement System,
in 2002 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 381, 385 (B. Hawk ed., 2003).
235
Case T-1/89, Rhone-Poulenc SA v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. II-867, at II-954,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61989F0001:
EN:NOT.
236
Joshua, supra note 150, at 1262.
237
Sklansky, supra note 72, at 1646 (“Introducing evidence of an out-of-court
accusation from someone who never testifies raises some of the same concerns as
examining a witness outside the defendant’s presence: in either case the defendant has
no opportunity to cross-examine the accuser in front of the jury.”).
238
Van Barlingen & Barennes, supra note 149, at 9; Joshua, supra note 9, at
1, 3, 5-6.
239
Forrester, supra note 7, 833; Joshua, supra note 9, at 5-6. The incentive to
embellish is two-fold. First, an undertaking applying for leniency has an incentive to
provide evidence of its co-conspirator’s bad acts while downplaying its own role to avoid
being viewed as a “ring-leader,” which would prevent it from receiving leniency.
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In this way, the use of oral testimony and oral leniency
applications as evidence absent a right to confrontation or
cross-examination is analogous to the obtainment and use of
the untested, ex parte statements of Lord Cobham in Sir Walter
Raleigh’s trial—a practice viewed as anathematic to a fair trial
in common law systems.241 Continuing the analogy to the
Raleigh trial, in EC procedure, the leniency-seeking coconspirator will have prepared an out-of-court confession under
intense pressure and with dubious accuracy, and the accused
has no procedural right to compel the presence of the coconspirator or to cross-examine the accusatory witnesses.242
Additionally, in both cases the evil arises based in part upon an
incompatible hybridization of adversarial and inquisitorial
legal systems.243 Moreover, as demonstrated in the Stolt-Nielsen
case, co-conspirators in the context of cartel enforcement may—
and often will—lie in exchange for leniency or, in the case of
also-rans, in retaliation for their co-conspirator’s admissions to
competition authorities.244 In fact, the role of the government
witnesses in the Stolt-Nielsen case is not unlike the position of
the “also ran” leniency applicants in the EC, since both had or
have a strong incentive to shade co-conspirator conduct in the
least favorable light.245 Therefore, given the need to utilize oral
evidence in cartel cases and the trend toward adversarial and
criminal cartel enforcement in the EC, the fairest solution is to
implement procedural reforms that would provide a right of
confrontation in EC competition hearings.

Second, in the context of “also-ran” undertakings, there is a heightened incentive to
provide as much evidence of anticompetitive behavior as possible, since the level of fine
reduction is tied to both the quantity and quality of the information provided. 2006 O.J.
(C 298) 17, 20 ¶ 23-26 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:C:2006:298:0017:0022:EN:PDF.
240
Forrester, supra note 7, at 833; Joshua, supra note 9, at 6-7.
241
Sklansky, supra note 72.
242
Forrester, supra note 7, at 833; Sklansky, supra note 72.
243
In Raleigh’s trial, the adoption of inquisitorial practices in the English
common law system prevented Raleigh from receiving a fair trial, whereas the current
failure arises from the adoption of increasingly criminal and adversarial procedures
without affording the accused fundamental rights. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 44-45 (2004); Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, at 143; Forrester, supra note 7, at
833-36.
244
United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 609, 623-24 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
245
Id.
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Proposals for Achieving Procedural Fairness in the EC

While the need for a right to confrontation within the
EC is recognized by many, one remaining question is how the
right should be introduced into the procedural scheme. First,
some commentators call for an explicit criminalization of cartel
conduct in the EC,246 which they view as a more effective means
of both deterring cartel conduct and garnering procedural
rights for targeted undertakings.247 Second, some contend that
the inherent criminal nature of cartel conduct justifies an
extension of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”) procedural protections, which include crossexamination, to the EC through the reviewing courts.248 Third,
others suggest reform from within the EC as a part of a
fundamental overhaul of EC procedure without direct reference
to the ECHR.249 However, based on the EC apprehension of and
distaste for these solutions, none are likely to be
implemented.250 Instead, the best solution is to provide for a
right of an undertaking subject to a Statement of Objections to
confront and cross-examine any witness who provides ex parte
oral testimony that the EC intends to use as evidence of a
violation of the competition laws.

246

Despite a clear trend toward criminalization of EC cartel law, Regulation
1/2003 explicitly states that decisions of the Commission to impose fines for violations
of Article 101(1) “shall not be of a criminal law nature.” Regulation 1/2003, supra note
134, art. 23, at 16-17; see also, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art.
101, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 88-89, available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF.
247
Chavez, supra note 30, at 842-43; Slater, Thomas & Waelbroeck, supra
note 7, at 4; Peter Whelan, A Principled Argument for Personal Criminal Sanctions as
Punishment under EC Cartel Law, 4 COMP. L. REV. 7 (2007), available at http://www.
clasf.org/CompLRev/Issues/Vol4Iss1Art1Whelan.pdf..
248
Slater et al., supra note 7, at 4.
249
Joshua, supra note 26, at 14. For a similar and very recent overview of the
inadequacies of EC competition procedures, criticizing the absence of crossexamination but ultimately advocating for a heightened standard of proof and more
rigorous judicial review, see generally James Venit, Human All Too Human: The
Gathering and Assessment of Evidence and the Appropriate Standard of Proof and
Judicial Review in Commission Enforcement Proceedings Applying Articles 81 and 82,
in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2009: EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE AND ITS
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPETITION CASES (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2010), available at http://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/
Competition/2009/2009-COMPETITION-Venit.pdf.
250
Marsden & Whelan, supra note 186, at 25.
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1. The European Convention on Human Rights
Some commentators have argued that EC cartel
enforcement already includes significant hallmarks of criminal
enforcement such that it should be subject to the procedural
safeguards of the ECHR, which includes a right to crossexamination.251 According to this theory, because the ECJ “has
always indicated its willingness to follow the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’),”252 and because
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty requires EU compliance
with the ECHR,253 the Commission’s procedures should square
with Article 6 of the ECHR, leaving “the adjudicating function
in antitrust cases to . . . a [competition specific] ‘judicial panel’
attached to the CFI.”254 Other commentators have argued for a
less institutionally disruptive ECHR-based solution, under
which the hearings will be mandatory in order to ensure ECHR
compliance, and the hearing officer will be elevated to the role
of finder of fact and law.255
However, the call for judicial extension of the ECHR to
EC cartel conduct is an ineffective and ultimately implausible
solution. First, the European Union does not currently have the
desire to formally criminalize cartel conduct.256 Further,
because the hearings themselves were specifically designed to
avoid ECHR application, any such modification will likely
require outside introduction from the courts—as well as
wholesale restructuring of EC competition procedure—which is
impracticable.257 Additionally, the relevant courts have held
that because the EC Commission is not a formal “tribunal” as
defined under the ECHR, it is not subject to its procedural
requirements.258 Finally, even if the levels of fines in EC
hearings are “criminal” under the ECHR, commentators have
noted that EC procedure is nonetheless compatible with Article
6 because the fines lie outside of the “hard core of criminal
251

Forrester, supra note 7, at 828-29; see also Slater et al., supra note 7, at 4.
Slater et al., supra note 7, at 3, 26 (noting that case law from the ECtHR
has held that “[a]n oral, and public, hearing constitutes a fundamental principle
enshrined in Article 6 § 1”).
253
Forrester, supra note 7, at 822.
254
Slater et al., supra note 7, at 46.
255
Forrester, supra note 7, at 841-43.
256
Marsden & Whelan, supra note 186, at 25.
257
Forrester, supra note 7, at 831.
258
Joined Cases 100-103/80, SA Musique Diffusion Francaise v. Comm’n,
1983 E.C.R. 1825, 1881-84.
252

1528

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4

law,” and therefore need not meet its stringent procedural
requirements.259 Thus, a judicial extension of the ECHR is an
inapt method for achieving procedural fairness in EC
competition hearings.
2. Holistic Reform
Julian Joshua, former Deputy Head of the Cartel Unit
of DG Competition, has seen first-hand the consequences of the
2002 EC procedural modernization efforts, and has developed a
solution involving fundamental procedural reform within EC
competition proceedings. In 1995, prior to the implementation
of Regulation 1/2003 and the leniency program, he contended
that the EC provided sufficient procedural safeguards.260
However, after the implementation of the leniency reforms in
2002, he began to advocate for a “bold and ‘holistic’ solution . . .
encompassing the whole scope of the enforcement process,”
both to improve the leniency program261 and to protect the “due
process” rights of implicated parties.262
First, where reliability is at issue, Joshua asserts that
“contemporaneous documentary evidence” should be given
more weight than statements that parties make during the
course of proceedings, including oral corporate statements.263
Second, those statements made for the purpose of obtaining
leniency should be viewed with particular caution, requiring a
259

Wouter P.J. Wils, The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial
Review and the ECHR, 33 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 5, 17 (2010)
(“Whereas the European Commission’s antitrust fining powers are not ‘criminal’ within
the meaning of EU law, they are ‘criminal’ within the wider autonomous meaning of
Article 6 ECHR. Inside the wider autonomous ECHR category of ‘criminal’, the
requirements of Article 6 ECHR are different for, on the one hand, the ‘hard core of
criminal law’, and, on the other hand, outside the hard core of criminal law. The
European Commission’s antitrust fining powers . . . are outside the ‘hard core of
criminal law’. Outside the hard core of criminal law, Article 6 ECHR allows for
criminal penalties to be imposed, in the first instance, by an administrative or nonjudicial body, that combines investigative and decision-making powers, provided that
there is a possibility of appeal ‘before a judicial body that has full jurisdiction,
including the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and of law, the
challenged decision’. Article 6 ECHR thus allows the imposition of antitrust fines by
the European commission and does not require any separation inside the Commission
between investigative and decision-making functions, provided that the EU Courts,
before which the addressees of Commission fining decisions can appeal, have ‘full
jurisdiction, including the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and of
law, the challenged decision’. . . .”).
260
Joshua, supra note 218.
261
Joshua, supra note 26, at 21.
262
Joshua, supra note 9, at 7.
263
Id.
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“high degree of corroboration by independent documentary
evidence.”264 Third, Joshua advocates for a procedure whereby
oral evidence used to prove violations should be “reduced to
writing in a formal witness statement, . . . signed by the
individual, and endorsed and acknowledged by the company on
whose behalf it is proffered.”265 Fourth, he calls for an almost
complete ban on anonymity for statements used to prove
infringement.266 Fifth, he simply states that “[d]eclarants should
be available at the oral hearing for cross-examination by the
parties incriminated.”267 Sixth, he advocates for amendments to
the EU regulations to penalize corporations and individuals for
giving misleading testimony.268 Lastly, he contends that oral
leniency applications should serve merely as a “roadmap” for
DG Competition investigations, and not as evidence of
infringement.269
Such a comprehensive overhaul in EC competition
procedure, however, is unworkable and unlikely.270 First of all,
as with the ECHR reform approach mentioned above, the EC
currently lacks an appetite for such sweeping reform.271 Instead,
a more palatable solution would provide real advancements in
an incremental manner.272 Second, the holistic reforms that
Joshua proposes with respect to admitting oral hearsay
testimony, based on a ‘reliability’ standard, contain the same
dangers of subjectivity in the Ohio v. Roberts approach that the
Supreme Court so persuasively rejected in Crawford v.
Washington.273 In fact, the zealousness with which competition
264

Id.
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Joshua, supra note 9, at 7.
269
Id.
270
Neelie Kroes, European Comm’r for Competition Policy, Antitrust and
State Aid Control-The Lessons Learned 5, Address at the 36th Annual Conference on
International Antitrust Law and Policy (Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://ec.eruopa.
eu/competition/speeches/index_theme_6.html. (“I agree again with Christine Varney
here—as enforcers we do have ‘special responsibility’ to ensure a fair and transparent
process. But the great weight of evidence says we meet this responsibility.”).
271
Marsden & Whelan, supra note 186, at 35.
272
Forrester, supra note 7, at 840.
273
541 U.S. 36. Although Joshua’s solution differs from the Ohio v. Roberts
approach by virtue of its reliance on contemporaneous documentary evidence
supporting reliability, the tendency in cartel enforcement in cartel cases to view each
price quote and email through a conspiratorial lens means that co-conspirators can
easily paint innocuous transmissions as severe violations. See, e.g., United States v.
Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 609, 619-20 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
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authorities have relied upon apparently reliable—but
ultimately false—oral evidence, as evident in the Stolt-Nielsen
case, reveals the necessity of a robust right of confrontation
above and beyond a requirement of contemporaneous
documentary evidence.274 As a result, Joshua’s suggestions are
simultaneously too comprehensive in scope and too soft in
recommendation. A superior solution would embrace
Crawford’s requirement that testimonial statements may only
be admitted if the declarant is available for crossexamination.275
3. A Right of Confrontation in the Spirit of Crawford
One of the principal problems to arise from the 2002
Leniency Notice was the fact that procedures were
implemented
without
preparing
adequate
procedural
276
protections. While a number of commentators have recently
advocated for increased procedural protections in EC
competition hearings,277 to date the proposals have been
infeasible. A more effective mechanism for securing procedural
fairness for undertakings in EC competition hearings would
allow cross-examination of adverse witnesses brought before
the EC in the spirit of Crawford v. Washington.
Currently, Regulation 773/2004 states that “[t]he
Hearing Officer may allow the parties to whom a statement of
objections has been addressed, the complainants, other persons
invited to the hearing, the Commission services and the
authorities of the Member States to ask questions during the
hearing.”278 An effective solution would add the following to that
regulation:
Undertakings subject to a Statement of Objections shall have an
opportunity to cross-examine any witness upon whose oral
statements—transcribed or otherwise—the Commission intends to
rely in proving an infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty. The
Hearing Officer shall include a statement concerning the credibility
of each testifying witness in his report.

274

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
Since the oral hearing is the first opportunity for the prosecuted
undertakings to hear the Commission’s witnesses live, the requirement of previous
cross-examination of unavailable witnesses set forth in Crawford is inapplicable here.
Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
276
International Cartels Roundtable, supra note 19, at 100.
277
See discussion supra Parts IV.B.1-2.
278
Regulation No. 773/2004, supra note 177, art. 7, at 21.
275
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This solution has a number of benefits. First, it avoids
the necessity for formal criminalization of cartel conduct, which
is currently impracticable within the EC.279 Additionally, as
mentioned above, there is currently no desire among the
member states of the EU, the General Court, and the ECJ to
criminalize cartel conduct, and as such, formal criminalization
is an ineffective means of achieving procedural fairness.280
Although some may argue that a right of confrontation
should only apply in criminal cases, and that therefore such a
right is not necessary in EC hearings, the strong trend in cartel
enforcement toward quasi-criminal investigations, an
adversarial hearing model, and increasingly stiff financial
penalties make the requirement that the hearings be criminal
merely semantic.281 Moreover, despite the lack of imprisonment
as a punishment for violation of Article 101,282 and the
limitation of the American Confrontation Clause to “criminal
prosecutions,”283 the imposition of crippling fines—affecting the
lives and livelihoods of employees—even within a quasicriminal framework provides a strong, prudential foundation
for a right of confrontation in EC competition hearings.
Further, some might contend that the aforementioned
proposal, which relies on an American case interpreting a
jurisdiction-specific constitutional provision, represents an
unjustified, anti-inquisitorial Anglocentrism.284 However, this
challenge simultaneously ignores the reality of the English and
American common law influence over the development of cartel
enforcement in the EC,285 as well as the procedural trends
toward a common law model that have taken shape within the
EC itself.286 Therefore, even if the EC fails to fully criminalize
cartel conduct, it should not be excused from extending key
procedural rights that bear directly on truth-finding, especially
when the procedures that already have been adopted so closely
mirror those of common law systems.287 Lastly, irrespective of
whether the EC disclaims the “criminal” nature of its cartel

279
280
281
282
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284
285
286
287

Forrester, supra note 7, at 826.
Marsden & Whelan, supra note 186, at 35.
See supra Part III.
Baudenbacher, supra note 128, at 354.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Sklansky, supra note 72.
Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, at 146.
See supra Part III.
See id.
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enforcement regime,288 the system should, at base, be concerned
with obtaining reliable, truthful evidence of the sort that only a
robust right of confrontation can ensure.289 This is especially
true where the credibility of its evidence-gathering techniques
is in question.
Second, allowing cross-examination will provide an
opportunity for targeted undertakings to directly test the
credibility of the EC witnesses in the presence of a neutral
hearing officer. In light of the Stolt-Nielsen decision, it is clear
that the opportunity to cross-examine such witnesses is vital to
a fair proceeding in the cartel enforcement context.290 Thus,
while the proposal here may not affect the opinions of the DG
Competition case team in its investigation, the Hearing Officer,
charged with making credibility determinations, will need to
make a decision as to the live credibility of each witness with
respect to the statements collected in the leniency and
investigation process. This will assuredly “improve the quality
of the contradictory debate.”291 Indeed, it will also provide
necessary procedural protections that will both improve the
quality of the evidence garnered in EC competition proceedings
and the fairness afforded those facing judgment.
It may be argued that placing the Hearing Officer in the
role of a decision-maker with respect to credibility raises the
same reliability concerns that the Supreme Court so forcefully
criticized in Crawford,292 since the hearing officer will
ultimately need to make a subjective determination about the
credibility of the adverse witnesses. However, this challenge
ignores the fact that the reliability test of Roberts was a
threshold issue used to determine whether the out-of-court
statements would be admissible as evidence, not whether the
trier of fact would ultimately make a subjective judgment.293
Under the current proposal, the requirement of crossexamination means that any oral statement may only be used
as a “roadmap” and not as evidence, unless the individual who
made the statement is available for cross-examination.
Moreover, because the Hearing Officer’s report is published in
288
289
290

See supra Part I.B.3.c.
See supra Part I.B.3.a.
United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 609, 623 (E.D. Pa.

2007).
291
292
293

Paulis, supra note 234, at 385-86.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-65 (2004).
Id.
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the Official Journal of the European Union,294 credibility
determinations will shine a light both on the quality of the
evidence and the efficacy of the procedures. As a result, the
proposed solution will incentivize the DG Competition case
teams to produce credible witnesses and ensure testimonial
accuracy.
Finally, the solution proposed here is incremental and
legislative, avoiding the problems that attend comprehensive
overhauls and judicially-mandated reforms.295 Creating a right
of confrontation and cross-examination in the Crawford mold
first solves the immediate problem of admitting untested and
unsworn oral statements gathered in the investigatory stage,296
while, at the same time, recognizing that oral statements are
vital in uncovering conspiracies and incentivizing undertakings
to apply for leniency.297 Additionally, this proposal gives the
accused an opportunity to challenge the credibility of witnesses
before a neutral hearing officer, creating a disincentive for
individuals and applicants for leniency to lie. Further, the
proposal advocated here requires only a minor amendment to
an existing regulation, incurring comparatively less
institutional and monetary costs than competing “holistic”
solutions, and representing a single-but-necessary step in an
incremental approach toward a robust set of procedural rights.
Although some may contend that the current proposal fails to
go far enough, the strength of the proposal lies in the fact that
it will allow the Commission and targeted undertakings to ease
into durable procedural protections. In this way, the current
proposal avoids the dangers of the initial effort to allow oral
corporate statements brought about in the 2002 amendments
to the Leniency Programme—which while an important
advancement, lacked necessary foresight and procedural
protections, providing too much room for abuse by the DG
Competition and leniency applicants.
294

Committee Decision on 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of hearing
officers in certain competition hearings, art. 16(3), 2001 O.J. L 162/21, at 24 (2001)
(“The Commission shall communicate the hearing officer’s final report, together with
the decision, to the addressees of the decision. It shall publish the hearing officer’s final
report in the Official Journal of the European Communities, together with the decision,
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business secrets.”); European Commission, Hearing Officers Reports, available at
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CONCLUSION

The introduction of procedures for accepting oral
statements in the leniency and investigatory contexts
represented an important addition to EC competition
procedure. However, the consequences of relying on oral
statements as evidence against co-conspirators include both a
shift toward the adversarial system of justice and a marked
increase in the need for procedural protections to prevent abuse
and to ensure testimonial accuracy. Centuries of common law
have demonstrated that the best way to protect against
overzealousness in law enforcement and dishonesty in
testimonial statements by co-conspirators is through crossexamination. Therefore, in order to ensure procedural fairness
in the EC, there must be a right for accused undertakings to
confront and cross-examine those witnesses on whose oral
statements the EC intends to rely as evidence.
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